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Abstract 
This paper develops the concept of EU proxy-mediation for the study EU mediation support. 
EU proxy-mediation is an indirect approach to conflict mediation where the EU works 
through intermediaries (proxy mediators) that are institutionally distinct from the EU foreign 
policy system in pursuit of its mediation objectives. Conceptually, the paper identifies drivers 
of EU proxy-mediation, strategies of proxy-mediation, and ways to manage EU-proxy 
relations. Empirically, the paper demonstrates the relevance of EU proxy-mediation activities 
for the case of EU mediation support in Libya. While the EU has not assumed a prominent 
profile as a direct mediator in Libya, it has actively engaged in proxy-mediation activities, 
providing mediation support to a variety of actors at the regional, national and local levels. 
Importantly, the EU facilitated coordination among key third-party mediators; provided 
financial support and training to a range of proxy mediators; and lend its own leverage to 
support peace initiatives of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The EU's proxy-
mediation activities in Libya show that the EU can play a meaningful mediation role through 
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second, it aims at stirring proxy mediators in line with EU mediation objectives. Our 
conceptual framework developed in this paper deals with drivers of EU proxy-mediation, EU 
strategies of empowering proxies, and managing EU-proxy relations. 
Empirically we will illustrate the relevance of different EU proxy-mediation strategies for the 
case of EU mediation in Libya. Addressing the complex, multi-level crisis in Libya has been 
described by the EU's High Representative Federica Mogherini as one of the EU's top 
priorities for promoting stability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (EEAS 
2017a). Simultaneously, the Libyan case constitutes a multi-party negotiation setting where 
the EU needs to define its role in relation to a number of other third-parties active in 
mediation. While the United Nations (UN) has established itself as the principle mediator 
through its Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), we show that EU proxy-mediation activities 
have played a significant role in facilitating the UN-led peace efforts. Furthermore, the EU has 
also offered its support to the mediation activities of a variety of transnational and local actors 
that mediate at the local level. Importantly, the EU facilitated coordination among key third-
party mediators; provided financial support and t raining to a range of proxy mediators and 
lent its own leverage to support peace initiatives. The EU's proxy-mediation activities in Libya 
show that the EU can play a meaningful mediation role in mediation processes through 
empowering others, highlighting the need for further works on this under-researched aspect 
of the EU's mediation activities. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We first give a brief overview of existing research on the EU's 
role in conflict mediation and highlight important ways in which the concept of proxy-
mediation can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the EU's mediation role. 
Consequently, we develop the concept of EU proxy-mediation in terms of drivers, strategies, 
and EU-proxy relations. The subsequent empirical section examines EU proxy-mediation in 
the Libya crisis. In the conclusion, we present a brief summary of our main findings and 
highlight promising avenues for future research. 
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(Diez and Tocci 2009; Yakinthou 2009), or the Western Balkans (Juncos 2005, Papadimitriou 
et al. 2007). Some of these works have also explicitly focused on the EU's role as a mediator 
(e.g. Grano 2010; Forsberg and Seppa 2010), provided interesting, case-specific insights on 
the EU's mediation role. More recently, scholars have engaged with the local dimension of EU 
peacebuilding, exploring how local actors and societies in conflict settings perceive and 
interact with EU peacebuilding efforts (Ejdus and Juncos 2017; Muller and Zahda 2017). 
Simultaneously, research has started to engage more systematically with the EU's specific role 
as a mediator in conflicts. Bergmann and Niemann (2015) have offered a conceptual 
framework for analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a conflict mediator, considering factors 
such as the EU's leverage and mediation strategy, the coherence of its mediation efforts, as 
well as factors pertaining to the conflict context. Though recent scholarship has made a 
welcome, and much overdue, contribution to our theoretical and empirical understanding of 
the EU's role as a conflict mediator, its analytical focus has predominantly been limited to 
cases of direct EU mediation. The concept of proxy-mediation, in turn, shifts attention to the 
fact that EU conflict mediation often takes place in a complex environment that involves 
multiple third parties, which provides for indirect and often less visible EU mediation 
strategies (see Gourlay 2011). In so doing, the concept of proxy-mediation provides a 
complementary perspective to studies on direct EU mediation, contributing to a richer, and 
more comprehensive understanding of the EU's mediation role. 
To be sure, the emphasis the concept of proxy-mediation places on the EU's crowded policy 
environment - and its interaction with other players - is not entirely new. Notably, it relates to 
previous research that has explored the EU's "inter-institutional interaction" with other 
international and regional organizations present in a particular policy area. A key argument 
advanced by this line of work is that overlap between the EU and another international and 
regional organization - in terms of mandate, functions and membership - creates a situation 
where the presence of other institutions in a given field may impact on the development 
and/or performance of the EU and vice versa (Oberthiir and Stokke 2011). The EU's interplay 
with other organizations may create tensions, or even competition and suboptimal policy 
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mediators) so that they can effectively address a conflict situation; and, second, it aims at 
stirring an intermediary in line with the EU's mediation objectives. The study of EU proxy-
mediation thus involves both the analysis of EU mediation support for other actors, including 
the effectiveness of this support, as well as the analysis of the EU's relation with proxy 
mediators. 
3.1 Drivers of EU Proxy-mediation: Why to Engage through Intermediaries? 
EU proxy-mediation responds to a number of demands placed by contemporary conflict 
environments that function as drivers of proxy-mediation. Perceived gains in terms of 
problem solving and legitimacy are a common motive for the decision to opt for indirect 
governance (see e.g. Cooley and Spruyt 2009: 4; Borzel and Risse 2005), which also applies to 
proxy-mediation. Importantly, proxy-mediation allows the EU to draw on outside resources 
provided by proxy-mediators, such as direct access to and leverage over disputants, regional 
or local knowledge about a conflict situation, or legitimacy as a conflict mediator. Today's 
conflicts are often intra-state in nature, take place in areas of limited statehood, where 
governmental authority is weak and fragmented, and involve a strong local dimension. Here, 
local mediators - who possess local authority, have access to local networks, and hold local 
knowledge - may perform key functions in conflict mediation (Mason 2009). For instance, in 
situations where the EU lacks legitimacy, access, or local knowledge, working through proxy 
mediators that enjoy trust and credibility within local society can enhance mediation 
effectiveness. Local mediators may create new entry-points for negotiations, facilitate 
consensus among key stakeholders, deepen dialogue, and shift the discourse towards peace. 
The EU may also opt for proxy-mediation strategies in situations where direct mediation 
appears too costly, ineffective or simply unfeasible. For instance, direct mediation can expose 
the EU to criticism of interfering with domestic affairs of host countries, which the EU can 
deflect by relying on proxies instead. Simultaneously, contemporary conflicts frequently 
involve "problematic" disputants and stakeholders, such as non-state armed groups or 
designated terrorist entities. Directly engaging with such actors can pose serious dilemmas for 
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the EU, such as the risk of legitimizing human rights violators (EEAS 2012). In some 
instances, the EU may also face legal constraints for engaging directly with disputants. For 
instance, the EU's counter terrorism legislation does not permit collaboration with listed 
terrorist entities, such as the Palestinian Hamas, the military wing of the Lebanese Hezbollah, 
the Columbian F ARC, or the Communist Party of the Philippines. Here, even low intensive 
direct mediation strategies like facilitation through dialogue and the channelling of 
information could cause significant problems for the EU with host governments or part of the 
international Community. Conversely, engaging via proxy mediators may allow the EU to 
promote its mediation objectives through an inclusive approach that involves all relevant 
stakeholders, whilst mitigating the risks posed by a direct engagement. 
Moreover, the EU may rely on proxy-mediation to escape institutional constrains related to its 
complex, multi-layered policy-making system (see Abbott et al. 2015: 27). EU coherence -
understood as the 'coordination and substantive agreement between individual member 
states' policies towards a conflict, and the mediation activities carried out by EU institutions' -
has been identified as a key condition for effective EU mediation (Bergmann and Niemann 
2015). In situations where the EU lacks internal coherence effective mediation becomes very 
difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Here, proxy-mediation can preserve the EU's capacity to 
act even in situations where it finds it difficult to agree on a joint direct involvement. 
Simultaneously, proxy-mediation can be a strategy to avoid the bureaucratic complexities and 
administrative constraints of day to day EU foreign policy-making. The reliance on flexible 
"proxy mediators" with a lean decision-making structure and a capacity to swiftly respond to 
fast moving conflict developments can be a real asset (see e.g. Muller 2014). 
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that EU proxy-mediation also comes with 
certain costs and trade-offs. EU mediation is not only linked to specific peacebuilding 
objectives, but also to efforts to promote the EU's public profile as an international actor (see 
e.g. Jett 2013). Evidently, proxy-mediation does not give the EU the kind of public visibility 
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that is often associated with a direct role in the mediation process. Proxy-mediation is thus 
not a particular effective strategy to promote the EU's public profile as an international 
peacemaker, though it still can earn it the trust and respect of policy insiders. Proxy-
mediation, moreover, can easily result in a certain disconnect of the EU from the kind of 
privileged information and intimate knowledge often enjoyed by mediators that are directly 
involved in the negotiation process. What is more, proxy-mediation may involve 
intermediaries that lack committed to the EU's own mediation objectives and its 
peacebuilding principles and values, such as the basic principles of international human rights 
and humanitarian law, transnational justice, or the representation of women in peace 
processes. 
The extent to which the EU is able to ensure that a proxy mediator acts in accordance with its 
own principles and preferences will depend on both, characteristics of the proxy mediator as 
well as the arrangement governing the EU's relationship with the proxy (see below). On the 
one hand, the EU may be interested to establish a tight control over a proxy mediator, 
allowing it to inject its own preferences into the mediation process. On the other hand, it is 
important to be aware that it may not always be desirable for the EU to exercise tight influence 
and control over proxy mediators, which may conflict with other EU peacebuilding objectives. 
As the literature on international trusteeship reminds us (e.g. Lake and Fariss 2014: 570), 
intermediaries that are "loyal" to a trustee may lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people, 
especially in situations of divergent policy preferences between a trustee and the population. 
Similarly, proxy mediators that closely pursue an EU sponsored agenda in conflict mediation 
may lose legitimacy in the eyes of local stakeholders with divergent preferences. Accordingly, 
empowering local actors as proxy mediators whilst respecting their autonomy can be a more 
productive strategy than tight control. Notably, strategies that preserve the authority of proxy 
mediators can make mediation processes more sensitive to local contexts, agencies and 
communities that can contribute to "bottom-up" peacebuilding dynamics, as demanded by 
the so-called "local turn" in the peacebuilding literature (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mac 
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but doing so often requires a coordinated effort (Beardsley 2013). Lending EU leverage is 
closely related to the direct mediation strategy of "manipulation", only that the EU does not 
function as the lead mediator that puts forward policy proposals and backs them up through 
its resources. Rather, the EU lends its support to the initiative of a proxy mediator, offering 
incentives to induce the parties to a dispute to change their behaviour and attitudes in line 
with the proposals of other mediators, who may lack sufficient resource on their own. For 
instance, the UN - which has assumed a prominent profile in conflict resolution around the 
globe - often depends on the support of its member states to incentivize its mediation efforts. 
3.3 The EU-Proxy Relationship: between Delegation and Orchestration 
Although the EU, as other international mediators, generally seeks to present itself as a 
"neutral" mediator, it is also a political actor that has developed its own normative 
peacebuilding framework and pursues strategic interests in world affairs (Bjorkdahl 2005; 
Diez and Pace 2011; Visoka and Doyle 2016). This also suggests an interest on the part of the 
EU to stir a proxy mediator in line with its own mediation objectives. The relationship 
between the EU and a proxy mediator is itself subject to negotiation and may take different 
forms, ranging from loose, informal coordination to contractual relationships. Works on 
indirect governance in international politics can provide us with helpful conceptual tools to 
study the EU-proxy mediator relationship. Recent scholarship on governance by international 
organizations (IOs) provides us with the distinction between the ideal type governance modes 
of "principal- agent delegation" and "orchestration" (see Abbott et al. 2015). 
Principle-agent delegation is a mode of indirect governance where the EU functions as a 
"principal" that has formal legal control over an "agent" (here a proxy mediator), invests it 
with authority vis-a-vis target actors, supervises its activities, and can ultimately rescind its 
authority (Abbott et al. 2015: 9). Orchestration, by contrast, is a mode of indirect governance 
where the EU functions as an "orchestrator" that needs to illicit the voluntary support of an 
"intermediary" (here a proxy mediator) over which it has no hard control. These two indirect 
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forms of IO governance, which in practice often blend into each other, are best understood as 
extreme points of a continuous scale that marks different degrees of "hardness" of EU control 
over an intermediary (Abbott et al. 2015: 10). For instance, a proxy mediator over which EU 
member states have established a relatively hard degree of control is the European Institute of 
Peace (EIP), which has been established in 2014 and has eight EU member states as well as 
Switzerland among its founding members (Bergmann 2017). As a "non-profit public-interest 
foundation" under Belgian law, the EIP is formally separate from the institutional structure of 
the EU and enjoys considerable operational independence. At the same time, the EIP has been 
established with the clear purpose of augmenting the Union's "global peace agenda through 
mediaiton and informal dialogue" (EPI 2016). The EIP also depends almost entirely on the 
funding of its member states, who also supervise its performance. This provides the EU with 
sufficiently more control over the EIP than it has, for instance, over other international 
organizations such as UN agencies to which it provides mediation support. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the possibilities for the conceptual analysis of the EU-
proxy mediator relationship are not limited to the concepts of orchestration and delegation, 
which generally shift the focus to the EU's relation with a specific proxy mediator. Conversely, 
complex relationships between the EU and multiple "proxy mediators" - as well as related 
efforts of EU coordination between multiple negotiators - may be productively studied 
through analytical concepts such as "network governance" (Slaughter 2002) or "network 
diplomacy" (Heine 2016; Ahtisaari, M. and Rintakoski 2016). This would allow to 
systematically explore the EU's role in global mediation networks, whose importance has 
become increasingly recognized by practitioners and researchers (Piiparinen and Brummer 
2012: 12; Neumann 2011). 
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EU support under the kSP framework for security initiatives and peace-building activities 
have thus far covered 250 projects in 70 countries with a total budget of 2.3 billion Euro 
(European Commission 2017a). These numbers indicate that mediation support has 
developed into a central element of the EU's toolkit for peacebuilding, with the EU actively 
providing mediation support in a number of conflict theatres around the world. 
In the remainder of this section we focus on EU proxy-mediation in the conflict in Libya. The 
complex, multi-level crisis in Libya constitutes a key challenge for the EU's stability interests 
in the region (Mi.ihlberger and Muller 2016), whilst posing many of the characteristics that 
call for proxy-mediation strategies. After a brief overview of the conflict situation in Libya, we 
will briefly illustrate the way the EU has empowered the mediation efforts of other actors 
through "coordinating"; "enabling"; and "lending leverage". Accordingly, the focus of our 
empirical case study is on the empowering aspect of proxy-mediation, rather than on the EU's 
efforts to stir proxy mediators. 
4.1 The Conflict Situation in Libya: Multi-Party Mediation in a Complex Conflict 
Environment 
Addressing the multi-level conflict in Libya has been a major challenge for international 
mediation efforts. The inability of Libya's National Transition Council (NTC) to achieve a 
successful transition after the fall of the Qadhafi regime has led to the eruption of a second 
civil war (2014-16). The main rival camps in the conflict have been the democratically elected 
and internationally recognized government of the House of Representatives, also known as 
the Tobruk government, and a rival government in Tripoli endorsed by the General National 
Congress, composed of key parties that had lost Libya's 2014 elections. Both governments 
were backed by their own military blocs, commonly referred to as the Dignity bloc (House of 
Representatives) and Dawn bloc (General National Congress). Yet, from the outset Libya's 
civil war has been more complicated than a confrontation of two rival blocs, each with its own 
government and parliament (Washington Post 2015). Rather, Libya has been facing a 
multitude of small-scale conflicts across the countries, which involve local militias and a 
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variety of jihadi groups with a high degree of autonomy from the main political and military 
coalitions at the national level. At the same time, regional countries like Egypt, the United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Sudan and Turkey provide backing to their preferred Libyan clients in 
the conflict, whilst international actors like Russia also maintain an active interest. 
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has established itself as the lead 
mediator at the peace process at the national level (Collombier 2016), though a number of 
actors provide mediation services and intervene politically. Following the eruption of Libya's 
second civil war, UNSMIL mediation efforts aimed at the formation of a national unity 
government to address the institutional crisis at the national level, as well as a ceasefire and 
confidence building measures involving the major rival factions. In December 2015, 
negotiations produced the Libyan Political Agreement, in which the rival political camps in 
Tripoli, Tobruk and elsewhere in the country agreed on the formation of a Government of 
National Accord. The agreement was unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council, 
which recognized the Government of National Accord as Libya's sole legitimate executive 
authority (UNSC 2015). However, since early 2016 the conflict between the Libyan House of 
Representatives and the General National Congress has again intensified, with the former 
withdrawing its support of the Government of National Accord in summer 2016. 
At the same time, the fragmented conflict situation in Libya has been marked by rapidly 
shifting alliances and entails a strong local dimension, where in many areas elders, tribal 
leaders and notables hold legitimacy and influence on the ground (McGregor 2015). The high 
degree of political and territorial fragmentation in Libya and the importance of regional tribal 
cleavages has given rise to the view that the inclusion of local actors is also central for the 
success of peacebuilding at the national level, not least to secure the implementation and 
sustainability of agreements between rival factions (Collombier 2016: 31). At the same time, 
military confrontation involving armed groups that respond to leaders from local 
communities and cities by themselves constitute a major factor of insecurity and have caused 
severe hardship and humanitarian crises. This has spurred local mediation efforts on the part 
of the UN, as well as of other international and transnational actors involved in peacebuilding, 
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to also address conflict dynamics in communities and towns. Local actors from civil society 
have also taken matters in their own hands, entering into dialogue and negotiations to resolve 
conflicts and crisis that impacted on the daily lives in their local communities. 
The complexity of mediation efforts in Libya is further compounded by a multitude of 
external actors that intervene in the mediation process. While the UN has assumed a 
prominent role as a lead mediator at the national level, the conflict is also addressed through 
other actors acting on their own as well as in support of the UN. The Libya Quartet -
composed of the African Union (AU), the EU, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN -
coordinates the positions of its members on the peace process in Libya. The EU first 
participated in the Quartet in March 2017, with the other members previously meeting as 
Troika. The Quartet supports the lead mediation role of the UN, which is represented by its 
Special Representative for Libya who also heads the UNSMIL mission. At the same time, 
individual participants of the Quartet also are actively involved in their own mediation 
activities. The AU has established a "High Level Committee on Libya" that meets regularly 
and the AU' s Special Representative for Libya actively engages with key Libyan and 
international stakeholders. At the same time, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Chad, and 
Sudan have established the Mechanism of Libya's neighbours, through which they routinely 
consult at the level of foreign ministers (The Arab Weekly 2017). As neighbours they are not 
only directly affected by the crisis in Libya, but they also have close ties with key actors in 
Libya. 
4.2 The EU's Mediation Role in Libya: Coordination, Enabling and Lending Leverage 
While the EU has not assumed a prominent profile as a direct mediator in Libya, it has 
actively engaged in proxy-mediation activities, providing mediation support to a variety of 
actors at the regional, national and local levels. An important element of the EU' s support has 
been the "coordination" of the UN led peace efforts in Libya at the national level. In its 
declarations on Libya, the EU routinely expresses its support for UNSMIL's mediation 
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activities, recognizing the UN's leading role in mediating in the political process at the 
national level. Given the diplomatic weight of the EU, its support for UNSMIL as the principle 
international framework for facilitating the process for a political settlement in Libya is 
important for maintaining a mediator focus in this multiple actor negotiation setting. 
Since the establishment of the Libyan Political Agreement, the EU has been working closely 
with UNSMIL to facilitate the implementation of the agreement, supporting mediation efforts 
to bring the relevant parties into the agreement (EEAS 2017b). At the same time, the EU has 
also worked towards a unified international and regional approach vis-a-vis the peace process 
in Libya, including EU coordination efforts with the League of Arab States, the African Union, 
and the UN through the framework of the Libya Quartet. The EU first participated in the 
Libya Quartet in March 2017, with the other members previously meeting as Troika. The 
invitation by the other members for the EU to join the Quartet testifies of their recognition of 
the EU's role in the international peacebuilding diplomacy. In May 2017, the EU hosted the 
second meeting of the Quartet in Brussels, providing a venue for international coordination. 
The Quartet's meeting in Brussels, as its previous meeting in Cairo in March 2017, concluded 
with a joint communique in which the members of the Quartet presented their coordinated 
position on several substantive issues. In its Brussels Communique, the Quartet expressed, 
inter alia, its continued support for the Libyan Political Agreement, the rejection of foreign 
military intervention, the support of the Government of National Accord, as well as its 
support for UN leadership in facilitating amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement 
(Libya Quartet 2017). 
Besides assuming an active coordination role, the EU has also "lent its leverage" to back up 
UN mediation initiatives. Notably, the EU has been giving targeted financial and technical 
support to those actors in Libya that have gained international recognition by the UN and 
support the UN-led political process. The EU's bilateral support to Libya currently amounts to 
120 million Euro, which goes to six sectors: civil society, governance, health, youth and 
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education, migration and protection, and support of the political process, security and 
mediation (EEAS 20 l 7b). Together with individual EU members states the EU is also the 
main contributor to the so-called Stabilisation Facility for Libya (SFL), which involves 12 
international donors that have pledged about 28 million Euro (USAID 2017). Besides 
promoting development objectives, the Stabilization Facility for Libya also aims at 
strengthening the political authority of the Libyan Government of National Accord. Among 
other things, it promotes tangible "quick wins" through projects at the local level that restore 
basic public services and infrastructure. In addition to positive measures in support of actors 
that support the UN-led political process, the EU has also supported the implementation of a 
number of restrictive measures that have been issued by the UN Security Council (UNSC 
2016) against leading Libyan political opponents against the political agreement. 
Simultaneously, the EU has also sought to enable the UNSMIL as the lead mediator through 
technical and financial support. Among other things, the EU h as offered technical support to 
UNSMIL through the security related planning and intelligence capacity of its Liaison and 
Planning Cell (EULPC) (EEAS 2017b). Simultaneously, the EU also has provided technical 
and financial support to the mediation activities of the UN's Development Programme 
(UNDP) as well as to a series of transnational actors, who engage in peace initiatives at the 
local level. Addressing the local conflict dimension, the EU has been operating 12 
peacebuilding projects in Libya with a volume of over 29 million Euro since 2014 through its 
"Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace" (IcSP) (European Commission 2017b). Five 
of these projects have a specific focus on mediation support. Besides UNDP, these projects are 
implemented by the transnational actors "Promediation", the "Peaceful Change Initiative", 
and the "Centre for Humanitar ian Dialogue" (European Commission 2017c). These actors 
often maintain a permanent presence inside Libya and have strong local networks and 
expertise, which allows them to provide mediation services in this demanding and volatile 
context. This has been important for the EU, whose delegation to Libya was temporarily 
relocated to Tunis following the outbreak of violence in 2014. 
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a multi-party mediation environment in Libya, where the UN has established itself as the lead 
mediator whilst other international mediators such as the League of Arab States, the African 
Union, and Libya's neighbours also undertake mediation initiatives. At the same time, the 
complex, multi-level conflict in Libya is marked by considerable political and territorial 
fragmentation and requires mediation initiatives to address conflicts at various levels, 
including numerous local disputes. The local conflict dimension has posed particular 
challenges to the EU, including problems of access as well as a lack of local knowledge and 
legitimacy. In dealing with these multiple challenges the EU has relied on valuable resources 
of a range of intermediaries, including transnational actors with a presence in Libya. 
Our empirical analysis has shown that the EU has employed different proxy-mediation 
strategies to provide support to third-party mediators in Libya, encompassing the 
coordination of mediation activities, the enabling of third-party mediators through financial 
and technical support, as well as lending leverage to incentivize mediation initiatives of others. 
Through these different proxy-mediation strategies the EU has addressed both, the national 
dimension of the Libyan conflict as well as local conflict dynamics. While the conflict 
situation at the national level has remained volatile even after the 2015 Libyan Political 
Agreement, EU sponsored mediation initiatives at the local level - such as the mediation 
efforts of the NGO Promediation between the Tebu and Touareg tribes - have produced some 
notable progress. This shows that the EU's mediation support for others can be an effective 
way to facilitate progress towards peace, even in situations where the EU itself does not engage 
in substantive direct mediation efforts. To derive at a more comprehensive understanding of 
the EU's mediation role, it thus seems important to engage in further efforts towards 
conceptualizing the EU's role and effectiveness in providing mediation support to others and 
studying it empirically. 
A more comprehensive understanding of the EU's mediation role - that transcends the 
literature's dominant focus on direct EU mediation - can also be considered to be of 
considerable interest from a policy perspective. In addition to producing policy relevant 
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insights that can help the EU to optimize its mediation support, a systematic analysis of EU 
mediation support can also help the EU to better manage expectations related to its role as an 
international mediator. As noted above, direct EU mediation is generally considered well 
suited to promote the EU's public profile as an active international mediator, which can 
generate demands for an active EU role. Yet, as argued in this paper not every conflict context 
is equally conductive for direct EU mediation efforts and, for itself, the search for prestige is 
generally considered ill-guidance for opting for a direct mediation role (see Jett 2013: 110). 
Accordingly, directing attention to proxy-mediation is important to facilitate a more 
informed policy debate about the prospects of EU mediation and the available policy tools and 
strategies. 
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